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Developing Land-Locked States and
The Resources of the Seabed
MARTIN IRA GLASSNER*
On the eve of the third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, an internationalist can only anticipate the outcome with
a mixture of hope and trepidation. The hope springs from several
declarations and actions of the United Nations and a number of
States and groups of States which seem to display the same kind
of "enlightened self-interest" which produced the Antarctic Treaty
and the outer space treaties, timid but useful steps toward restrain-
ing the fervid nationalism of the third quarter of the twentieth
century. The trepidation arises from the repeated attacks upon
and dilution of the historic 1967 proposal of Ambassador Pardo of
an international regime for the seabed for the common benefit of
mankind and in particular the poor, or developing, countries.
The late Professor Friedmann expressed the fear of many when
he said,
In our overcrowded world, navigation, as well as the exploita-
tion of the living and mineral resources of the sea, must be the
subject of planning and regulation for the common benefit of man-
kind. But an unholy alliance of governments, interest groups, and
lawyers is working toward nothing less than the partition of the
* B.A., Syracuse Univ.; M.A., Cal. State, Fullerton; Ph.D., Claremont
Graduate School. Dr. Glassner is currently Assistant Professor of Geog-
raphy, Southern Connecticut State College, New Haven.
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seabed and therefore, inevitably, of the oceans themselves. To re-
main silent or passive toward such a development is to partici-
pate in the destruction of the principal achievements of interna-
tional law in the last few centuries and to accept the preparation
of an Orwellian nightmare.'
It is possible that Friedmann overstated his case somewhat, possi-
bly for literary effect, but his thesis seems quite valid. And for
this observer also, at the moment the trepidation overshadows the
hope.
This article is an attempt to focus a beam of light on a relatively
obscure facet of the seabed question, one which illustrates clearly
the validity of Friedmann's thesis.2 In a comprehensive discussion
of the transit trade of developing land-locked states, first written
in the Fall of 1967, the present writer raised a question which could
not be addressed at the time because it really constituted a separate
study:
The question is, if the sea is in fact res communis, the common
property of all, and if even land-locked states have the right to
transit freely to and from it and navigate freely upon it (and both
concepts are by now well embedded in international law), why
should land-locked states not also share in the resources of the
sea? ... Surely some formula can be found which would enable
the land-locked states to share equitably in the wealth of the sea.3
It seems appropriate to pursue the quest for such a formula now.
THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
There are in the world today some 26 land-locked States, in addi-
tion to a number of land-locked microstates, dependencies and other
political entities. Of these States, all but the five in Europe are
poor, at least in economic terms, and may be considered "develop-
ing." These countries, then, suffer in the modern world from the
double handicap of lacking a seacoast and being poor and weak.
In addition, of the 21 developing land-locked States, 15 are among
the 25 States designated by the United Nations as "the hard-core
least developed countries."4 So severe are the development prob-
lems of these countries that for nearly 20 years they have been
given special attention by the United Nations and its affiliates and
specialized agencies. One of the fruits of such attention is the
1. W. FRIEDANN, PREFACE, THE FuTuRE Or THE OcEAns (1971).
2. A good useful survey is Note, The Interests of Land-Locked States
in Law of the Seas, 9 SAx DIEGo L. RLv. 701 (1972).
3. M.I. GLASSNER, AccEss TO THE SEA FOR DEVLoPiNG LANm-LOCKM
STATEs 204 (1970).
4. Afghanistan, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Chad, Laos, Lesotho, Mal-
awi, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sikkim, Uganda and Upper Volta. TD/
B/429/Add.1.
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1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked States. While
efforts to improve their access to the sea continue, they have not
been entirely forgotten in the preparatory discussions for the Cara-
cas Law of the Sea Conference dealing with the sea itself and its
resources.
In its Resolution 2749 (XXV), Declaration of Principles Govern-
ing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof Be-
yond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the General Assembly
of the United Nations on December 17, 1970, declared, inter alia,
5. The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses by all States whether coastal or land-locked, without dis-
crimination, in accordance with the international regime to be es-
tablished .... 5 (emphasis supplied)
On the same day, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2750
(XXV), the basic resolution on the seabed which authorized a new
U.N. conference on the Law of the Sea. Section B is devoted to
"the special problems of land-locked countries" and requests the
Secretary-General to report on the subject to the Seabed Commit-
tee. The subject was subsequently divided in the Seabed Commit-
tee into eight subitems to be discussed in Caracas this summer.
This paper deals with three of them:
9.2.3: Free access to the international sea-bed area beyond na-
tional jurisdiction;
9.2.4: Participation in the international regime, including the ma-
chinery and the equitable sharing in the benefits of the area;
9.3: Particular interests and needs of developing land-locked
countries in the international regime.
Many of the other subjects dealt with by the Seabed Committee
and to be discussed in Caracas are of direct interest to land-locked
states, such as an exclusive economic zone beyond the territorial
sea itself, development and transfer of technology, regional ar-
rangements, freedom of transit on the high seas and through
straits, preservation of the marine environment, scientific research
and peaceful settlement of disputes. These shall be referred to
only in passing, while concentrating on the primary topic.
The first and perhaps most difficult problem to solve is the size
of the area to come under the authority of an international seabed
5. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970), 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 220, 221
(1971).
regime, from which the land-locked states may be expected to de-
rive the most long-term benefits. Effectively, this means deter-
mining the boundary between national and international jurisdic-
tions on the seabed, or, in the parlance of the United Nations, "the
limits of national jurisdiction."
THE LimiTs OF NATIONAL JUmSDICTiON
The trend since World War II has been for coastal States to ex-
pand their national territories by annexing portions of the sea,
as through World War II they expanded their national territories
through the annexation of areas of land, adjacent to them or half
a world away. Beyond the annexed areas, they have claimed areas
of "national jurisdiction" for special purposes. The "great sea
rush" anticipated apprehensively by many has already begun. Pol-
iticians, geologists, diplomats, economists and lawyers have mar-
shalled ingenious arguments backed by volumes of statistics and
precedents, all designed to prove that it is "natural" and "legiti-
mate" for coastal states to acquire as much of the sea and sea-
bed as they feel can be of value to them into the immediate future,
while laying the foundations for more extensive claims later on.
Have we forgotten so soon the German "geopoliticians" of the
1930's who produced enormous quantities of books, maps, articles
and speeches to justify German expansionism on the grounds of
"natural rights", 'the "organic state" theory, and so on? While it
seems to have been generally accepted in recent years that the
World Ocean shall not be entirely parcelled out among the coastal
and insular states, the area to be reserved for international juris-
diction; i.e., "the common heritage of mankind," is in the process
of being defined as "what is left over after every coastal and in-
sular state takes whatever it thinks might be of use to it in
the foreseeable future." How different is this in practice from
Germany of the 1930's?
Rather than bickering over the precise definition of the phrase
"common heritage of mankind" and debating whether or not it
has precise legal antecedents, as is being done now to an almost
absurd degree,6 let us accept it as a welcome addition to the gen-
erally dull and uninspired lexicon of international law; a phrase
which truly articulates the aspirations of the peoples of the world.
Let us begin with the premise that the entire sea, right up to
6. For one of the less irrational discussions of this matter, see Gorove,
The Concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind": A Political, Moral or
Legal Innovation?, 9 SAx Dx-ao L. REv. 390 (1972).
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the mean high tide line, belongs to -all the peoples of the world,
with only a narrow coastal strip being allocated to the coastal and
insular states for their legitimate and urgent needs. As Elisabeth
Mann Borgese has so succinctly stated: "Ocean Space is an indi-
visible ecological whole."
Accepting the necessity for boundaries in the sea, both between
adjacent national sea areas and, more important, between the na-
tional and international areas, we must consider where this latter
boundary shall be. Ideally, the international agency should have
title to and complete jurisdiction over the "indivisible ecological
whole" of the sea, the airspace above it and the earth beneath
it. The agency, operating on behalf of all mankind, could then
regulate in a rational manner the exploration and exploitation
of more than 70% of the earth's surface so as to derive from it the
the maximum benefits for all the peoples of the earth consistent
with the maintenance of the integrity of the marine environment. 8
Such an ideal solution, however, is simply impossible to attain in
this age of fervent nationalism, a malady suffered by rich and poor
alike; the poor countries have no monopoly on virtue and the rich
countries have no monopoly on avarice.
We must therefore settle for a regime which comes as close as
possible to this ideal. There are several approaches to defining
the breadth of the area of national jurisdiction. Here we shall
consider only the three most commonly presented:
1) One internationally agreed vertical line drawn through air,
sea and seabed, separating the zone of national sovereignty, extend-
ing a specified distance out to sea from the shore, from the inter-
national zone. Such a line would be relatively easy to locate, mark
on maps and administer. It would include all elements of the
physical environment within each zone and would facilitate ra-
tional planning and development within each zone with appro-
priate differences in treatment of the airspace, water column and
7. E.M. BORGESE, THE OCEAN R.mm: A SUGGESTED STATUTE FOR THE
PEACEFUL USES OF THE HIGH SEAS AND THE SEA-BED BEYOND =H Lnmvr oF
NATIONAL JURISDICTION (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Occasional Paper Vol. I, No. 5, Santa Barbara, Calif., 1968), at 9.
8. For an elaboration of this theme and a fine review of the seabed
negotiations to date, see Note, The Politics of the Ocean, 47 VA. Q. REv.
505 (1971).
seabed. This assumes that a spirit of cooperation exists between
each coastal state and the international agency, as well as coopera-
tion among and between the zones.
The difficult question to answer is whether the boundary should
create a broad or a narrow zone of national sovereignty over the
resources therein. Varying distances from shore have been sug-
gested, ranging out to 200 miles or even beyond in some places
to the outer edge of the continental margin.9 A broad belt of
national sovereignty would reduce the area left for management
by an international regime, perhaps to a meaningless factor, would
make comprehensive conservation programs very difficult to plan
and carry out, and would push the land-locked States even farther
back from the resources of the sea than they are now. On the
other hand, a narrow national zone, e.g., 30 miles in breadth, would
mitigate some of these problems but leave others, such as national
sovereignty extending as territorial sea out to the 30-mile line. This
could create difficulties for fishing, navigation and other activities
hitherto unrestricted on the high seas.
2) The present system (or more properly, lack of system) where-
by each state determines for itself its own limits in the sea. This
system provides no satisfactory guidelines for seaward boundaries;
even the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf contains no
precise formula which would restrict unilateral claims. Despite
the vigor with which this system has been advanced, particularly
by some developing countries, it is a formula for international an-
archy.
The idea that every state may fix its national jurisdiction within
reasonable limits is being put forth by its proponents as a panacea
for developing countries. This is particularly unfortunate. Since
any state with good lawyers at its disposal can make out a reason-
able argument for virtually any limit, the ultimate result would
be unlimited extensions of national jurisdiction....
For every interest a coastal state conceives, it can invent another
limited jurisdiction or contiguous zone thesis; each time there is
a longer list of precedents for another type of unilateral claim.' 0
This approach places not only the land-locked, but also the shelf-
locked and sea-locked States at a distinct disadvantage, leaving
only a relative handful of States which, because of history or geo-
9. Even Ambassador Pardo seems to have succumbed to the 200-mile
fetish, though with qualifications, in his Draft Ocean Space Treaty (Work-
ing Paper Submitted by Malta), U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/53 (1971).
10. John R. Stevenson, Conflicting Approaches to the Control and Ex-
ploitation of the Oceans, Address by the Legal Advisor of the United States
Department of State to the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (1971), 65 Am. J. oF INT'L L. 110-11 (1971).
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graphical location, are able to expand outward theoretically to the
median line of each ocean basin.1 Clearly, the trend toward le-
gally unrestricted territorial expansion in the sea must be arrested
and, if possible, reversed.
3) The establishment of multiple boundary lines in the sea by
international agreement, with national jurisdiction extending out-
ward from the coast (or straight baseline) for varying distances
for various functions. As a minimum there would be a territorial
sea with its superadjacent airspace, and sovereignty (or at least
jurisdiction) over the continental shelf and subsoil thereof, with
agreed limits. It is also suggested that there be separate national
zones for fishing, pollution control, defense and other functions.
This seems to be the trend at the present time, the approach fa-
vored by most of the States on the Seabed Committee and the
one most likely to be adopted in Caracas. It might result in a
multitude of boundaries, some difficult to locate and many difficult
to administer, but it does have the advantage of flexibility and
would require a minimum of retreats on the part of States which
have already extended limited jurisdiction for various purposes far
out to sea.
For the land-locked States, this approach has no inherent ad-
vantages or handicaps. Hopefully, as each boundary is established,
adequate provision will be made for these countries to function
on equitable terms both within and beyond the respective national
zones, perhaps on a regional basis. If the land-locked States are
left to negotiate access to the resources of the sea with individual
coastal states on a bilateral basis, they will be no better off than
they are now with respect to access to the sea itself.
A consensus seems to be emerging on a twelve-mile territorial
sea; if adequate provision is made for free passage through interna-
11. Land-locked States are those such as Paraguay, Chad and Mongolia
which have no sea coast whatever; shelf-locked States have sea coasts but
share the continental shelf with States opposite them, or must cross an-
other State's continental shelf to reach the deep seabed, such as the States
surrounding the North Sea and the Persian Gulf; sea-locked States such
as Haiti cannot extend their territorial seas or continental shelves because
of the proximity of other States. To this group may be added these with
very short coastlines, such as Zaire and Jordan; and those facing on semi-
enclosed seas, such as both Koreas and Italy, which are also disadvantaged
in this respect.
tional straits for ships which carry cargo to and from land-locked
as well as coastal States, and for innocent passage through -the terri-
torial waters, then this should be quite acceptable to the land-
locked States. It also appears likely that some type of "economic
zone" or "patrimonial sea" will be established at Caracas which
will give coastal States jurisdiction of some kind over at least the
living resources of the sea for some distance beyond the territorial
sea. If this zone is not too broad and if the land-locked States
can somehow share in the profits to be made from the resources
therein, then this can be acceptable also. However, the 200-mile
claim advanced by several Latin American States in Santo Domin-
go in June 1972 and supported in essence by many African States
in Addis Ababa in May, 1973,12 seems to be based more on narrow
economic and political considerations than on the alleged need for
conservation of fish stocks.'3 Separate analysis could be made of
each of the function-based boundaries suggested, but we are spe-
cifically concerned here with the boundary between national and
international zones on the seabed.
The terms "seabed," "ocean floor" and "continental margin" are
used extensively in the literature and by diplomats debating var-
ious questions of the Law of the Sea. Definitions vary, however,
often according to the goal desired by the user. For example,
The term "seabed" refers specifically to the sediment fill at the
bottom of the marginal, semi-enclosed seas which is very closely
related in its origin, source and deposition to the continental land
mass surrounding it. The term "ocean floor" and its oceanic sedi-
ments refers to the great oceanic basins related to the oceanic crust
which includes midoceanic ridges, valleys, troughs and abyssal
plains and canyons.14
This is a clear attempt to use "science" to justify a political objec-
tive; i.e., the recognition of the world's semi-enclosed seas as "dif-
12. Declaration of Santo Domingo, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/80 and Organi-
zation of African Unity Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea,
A/AC.138/89 (1973).
13. W.S. Wooster points out, for example, that for a thousand miles
along the coast of Peru, the 200 meter isobath lies from 30 km to 130
km offshore, averaging about 75 oin, and that the area of less than 200
meters water depth, which may be considered "continental shelf," is esti-
mated at about 87,000 square kilometers, larger than the similar area of
83 states. Peru's claim that she needs a 200-mile "patrimonial sea" to
compensate for an excessively narrow shelf would thus seem to have a
very weak foundation. Wooster systematically demolishes other argu-
ments supporting a 200-mile exclusive fisheries zone in his article, Scien-
tific Aspects of Maritime Sovereignty Claims, 1 OcEAN DLV. & INT'L L.J.
13 (1973).
14. Seidel, Coastal States' Perceptions of Mineral Regimes in the Gulf
and Caribbean Area, in GULF AND CAMUBEAN MTAnrmr PROBLEMS 28-29
(L. Alexander ed. 1973).
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ferent" from the rest of the ocean and therefore not appropriate
for inclusion in an international zone. Even if the semi-enclosed
seas were to be managed by regional organizations of the littoral
States (rather unlikely for some time in many cases because of
the mutual hostility of littoral States), the developing land-locked
States would be left out almost entirely since only one of them,
Laos, has its major maritime connection with a semi-enclosed sea.
The reason for this "maritime enclosure movement" is also quite
clear: "I suggest that these marginal semi-enclosed sea basins con-
stitute some of the most promising areas in the world for petro-
leum accumulation."15
Petroleum companies have, in fact, been among the most vigor-
ous proponents of "science" to justify the establishment of a "nat-
ural" boundary between national and international zones. This
"natural" boundary is commonly given as the outermost edge of
the continental slope. But this is no more a "natural" boundary
than the edge of the continental shelf, the mean low tide line or
'the mean high tide line. Hedberg and others have marshalled
much impressive geological evidence to prove the logic of the out-
ermost of these "natural" boundaries. But since "the true edge
of the continent is generally somewhat seaward from the base of
the slope because of the overlap of the slope by sediments of the
rise,"'16 this overlap of sediments makes it exceedingly difficult to
locate the precise outer edge of the shelf; therefore, the actual
boundary would have to be "safely within the limits of a broad
and admittedly only roughly defined zone adjacent to the base of
the slope . . . ." The breadth of the zone could be adjusted to
enclose almost anything deemed of value to the coastal States be-
yond the slope edge, and the boundary drawn as close as possible
to the outermost edge of the zone; i.e., placing part of the actual
ocean floor or abyssal plain under coastal state jurisdiction!17 Hed-
berg then suggests 100 km "as the minimum technically practical
width of the boundary zone" but then departs from the "natural
15. Hedberg, Continental Margins from Viewpoint of the Petroleum Ge-
ologist, 54 Am. A. PETROLEum GEOLOcasTs BuLL. 28 (1970). Hedberg works
for Gulf Oil Corporation and for the National Petroleum Council.
16. H.D. H-IBEEG, NATiONAL-INTERNAIONAL JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARY
ON THE OCEAN FLOOR (Law of the Sea Institute, Occasional Paper No. 16,
Kingston, R.I., 1972) at 15-16.
17. Id. at 7.
boundary" concept when he admits that "some international po-
litical considerations might favor a much broader zone, perhaps 200,
300 or even 400 km.' 18
Another marine geologist, who is unconnected with the petro-
leum industry, has observed,
... it is not surprising that there have been a number of pro-
posals to redefine the continental shelf so as to extend it seaward
to whatever distance and to whatever depth are necessary to give
a nation access to the resources presumably lying or hidden
there.19
He goes on to point out that "on a global basis the edge of the
continental shelf ranges in depth from 20 to 550 meters, with an
average of 133 meters; the shelf ranges in width from zero to
1,500 kilometers, with an average of 78 km. '20
Thus, even the tentative legal definition of the continental shelf
as being the 200 meter isobath, appearing in the Continental Shelf
Convention, is most generous. Advocates of a broad shelf defini-
tion point to the judgement of the International Court of Justice
in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases which refers to the shelf
as a "natural prolongation" of the continent, but they ignore the
test of adjacency which must also be applied. "The Court has ob-
served that by no stretch of the imagination can a point, for ex-
ample, 100 miles off a coast be regarded as adjacent in the nor-
mal sense, but unfortunately, did not indicate what areas of the
sea do come within the adjacency concept .... ,"21 Because of this
imprecision, The National Petroleum Council and others have tried
to distort the meaning of "continental shelf" so as to justify in-
clusion of the entire continental margin-shelf, slope and rise-
within the national territory of the coastal State. This kind of
distortion of meanings is both unjustified and dangerous. Its ef-
fect on land-locked States would be to exclude them completely
from any portion of the continental margin without even a formal
international agreement to that effect.
The whole concept of "natural boundaries" is both ancient and
popular, but not necessarily valid. Extracts from two of the clas-
sic statements on boundaries may illustrate this point.
The adjective "natural" is unfortunate. Simply because a line
is marked by nature does not necessarily imply that it is a "natu-
18. Id. at 9.
19. Emery, The Continental Shelves, in THE OCEANS, A ScIMNT-c Aasma-
icAN BooK 41 (1969).
20. Id.
21. Bouchez, The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1 J. M~amTnvo L.
CoM. 118 (1969).
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ral" thing to utilize it for boundary purposes or that it may consti-
tute a desirable or "natural" line of separation between neighbor-
ing peoples. A political scientist has remarked that a "natural
boundary" becomes simply that natural feature somewhere beyond
a state's present political boundary to which its leaders would like
to expand. 22
First of all, we must realize that all international boundaries
are, in the final analysis, political phenomena; that is, they are
drawn by man to delimit the sphere of state authority. Most
boundaries are, therefore, an expression of power ... What
seems natural to one person or group may appear very unnatural
to his adversary, and what is accepted as natural in one era may
be considered a queer aberration by the next one....
We must therefore reject the word "natural" and allied terms
wherever they are meant to cast a magic spell over our judge-
ment.23
Mrs. Borgese has dismissed all consideration of "natural bound-
aries" in a recent discussion:
Today most people agree that the 200-meter isobath boundary
is a very whimsical delimitation and one that is, furthermore, com-
pletely obsolete. Many people who fifteen years ago argued in
favor of the depth criterion today find it unworkable. The same
goes for any combination of depth and width criteria. And the
geological criterion is totally obsolete.24
Since any boundary in the sea must be artificial, the most ra-
tional would be one consisting of straight-line segments and arcs
located an agreed distance offshore. It would be easiest to locate,
map and administer. But the "agreed distance" should not be the
200 miles claimed by many Latin Americans as the extent of "the
patrimonial sea."'25 Ideally, it should probably be between 30 and
22. S.W. BoGs, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 23 (1940) (At the time, Dr.
Boggs was The Geographer of the U.S. Department of State).
23. J. Broek, The Problem of "Natural Frontiers", in his Frontiers of the
Future, a series of lectures given at the University of California at Los
Angeles, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1941,
pp. 7-9.
24. Borgese, A Constitution for the Oceans, in TBE FATE OF Tm OCEAMS
5 (J. Logue ed. 1972).
25. The "patrimonial sea" doctrine is incorporated in the Declaration of
Santo Domingo promulgated by most of the Caribbean countries on 9 June
1972 and published in full in U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/80. Thomas A. Clingan,
Jr. has an interesting commentary on the Santo Domingo Conference in
his review, The Oceans, 4 LAWYER OF THE AM=ICAS 579. He points out
that "some concern was voiced over the status of the land-locked countries
of the region. However, the question was considered outside the scope
of the general principles adopted, and the question was postponed for
50 nautical miles from shore, a distance which would give the
coastal States, developed and developing, over 90% of the world's
proven offshore reserves of hydrocarbons and substantial quanti-
ties of a wide variety of minerals, while leaving virtually all of
the manganese nodules under the aegis of the international seabed
agency. 26 The 200-mile claimants, however, well know that all of
the proven hydrocarbon reserves, all of the presently exploitable
mineral resources and most of those having potential economic
value in the next several decades, and the most readily accessible
10% or so of the manganese nodules are found shoreward of this
limit.
The nodules may be found anywhere from shallow waters down
to depths of about 3500 meters. The most attractive sites are in
the shallow waters and on the outer parts of continental shelf,
the upper regions of the slope, and the tops and sides of the sub-
marine banks.2 7
Most of these areas would be included within a 200-mile limit
of national jurisdiction. This would leave the international seabed
area with the richest nodule concentrations, but those least econom-
ically feasible to mine. Despite the impressive technological ad-
vances of recent years, it is still very likely true that
commercial development of deep sea minerals is not likely to be
significant for many years to come. ... After development be-
comes significant, it will be many years before royalty or rental
payments will become large.28
Not only the developing land-locked States, but au developing
States are supposed to share in the income from deep sea mining
in the international area. But the countries which would acquire
the largest areas of seabed beyond the 200m isobath if the 200-
mile limit were to be adopted would not be 'the poor countries
at all, but rather the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Japan
and the Soviet Union, all among the countries which are also best
equipped to exploit any portion of the ocean bottom. The next
five largest gainers of territory from a broad shelf formula would
further study." A useful collection of background documents and com-
mentary is F.V. GAnCrA Awm  OR, LATIn AmxuCA mm TBE LAW or T=E SEA
(Occasional Paper No. 14, Kingston, R.L: Law of the Sea Institute, July
1972).
26. Economic Significance, in Terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of
the Various Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
138/87 (1973).
27. F. Christy, Marigenous Minerals; Wealth, Regimes, and Factors of
Decision, in SYMPosrUm oN T E ITmNATI ONAL REam OF = SEA-BED PRo-
cEEDInGs 118 (1970).
28. Id. at 131-32.
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be Indonesia, Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Norway.29 While four
of these countries are poor, they are far from the poorest and are
all significant producers of land-based minerals.
A glance at a bathymetric map of the world will reveal other
problems posed by wide limits of national jurisdiction. Small is-
lands and small seas, seamounts and guyots, and the likelihood of
artificial islands being constructed on the shelf, all would tend to
complicate matters, largely to the benefit of a handful of countries.
"If the limits are narrow, then the inequities and difficulties are
not particularly great. But as limits become larger, the problems
become more intransigent. 30
Summing up, it would appear that a broad economic zone giving
exclusive mineral rights in the continental shelf and adjacent sea-
bed would be of most value to a small group of rich and poor
countries, largely the former. It is a mystery why so many de-
veloping countries, largely in Africa and Latin America, are going
against their own long-term best interests in pursuit of short-term
tangible gains, and why even some developing land-locked States
are willing to go along with assignment of a relatively small re-
source base to an international seabed agency, while visions of
sugar plums dance in their heads.
Ax INTERNATIONAL SEABED AGENCY
It has been generally agreed that the Conference on the Law
of the Sea will establish some form of agency or authority to as-
sume responsibility for whatever portion of the ocean bottom re-
mains after "the limits of national jurisdiction" are determined.
What remain to be decided are the nature of the agency, a system
of representation of States in the agency and their participation in
the decision-making process. It is not within the scope of this ar-
ticle to survey all of the many proposals and draft treaties put
forward during the last decade by individuals, organizations and
States.31 Rather, we shall examine only some of their major fea-
29. Alexander, Indices of National Interest in the Oceans, 1 OcE-N DEv.
& INT'L L.J. 41 (1973). Since the nodules, petroleum and other resources
are very unevenly distributed, possession of extensive shelf area does not
alone guarantee great wealth-but it helps.
30. Christy, supra note 27, at 145.
31. An excellent summary of many of the proposals offered to date is
tures and suggest, in broad terms, what would be most equitable
for the developing land-locked States. Many observers and prac-
titioners consider that the issues of representation in the agency
and distribution of benefits are more important to the land-locked
and shelf-locked States than the limits of national jurisdiction.
This may well be true, but the questions deserve some attention.
In a recent article, the present writer anticipated that
[t]he international seabed authority, however constituted, will in-
clude representatives of land-locked states and its mandate will
somehow permit land-locked states to derive some material bene-
fits from the development of the seabed resources. 32
According to Friedmann, "the landlocked states are the only
group generally favoring a strong seabed authority with extensive
jurisdiction, including revenue-sharing."33 Fortunately this is not
entirely true, for the 13-power draft submitted by Latin American
countries in 1971 contains provisions (Articles 14-19) for a strong
authority indeed.3 4 This is well, for all the developing countries,
not only the mediterranean ones, have far more to gain from a
strong authority than from a weak one. It is they who have bene-
fited most from the United Nations itself and its many specialized
agencies.
Ideally, since "ocean space is an indivisible ecological whole,"
there should be one single international agency to own and man-
age the sea, the airspace above and the earth below beyond the
(hopefully narrow) limits of national jurisdiction on behalf of the
community of man and for the benefit of all. This agency should
be closely linked with the United Nations, if not indeed a formal
member of the U.N. family, and its profits should be transferred
to the U.N. for economic development programs. Such an agency,
however, is probably premature, given the presently primitive
stage of man's cooperative instincts. Therefore, we may immedi-
ately retreat one step from the ideal and suggest two separate
agencies with similar strong links to the U.N.; one to manage the
high seas and the airspace above, and one to manage the seabed and
subsurface thereof. Only the latter is of immediate concern to us
here, though it would be necessary for the two agencies to work
Sohn, The Council of an International Sea-Bed Authority, 9 SANr Diso L.
REv. 404 (1972). Professor Sohn advocates a strong international author-
ity with at least four of the 32 seats on its council reserved for land-
locked and shelf-locked States.
32. Glassner, The Status of Developing Land-Locked States Since 1965,
5 LwvRn ov TE AMERIcAs 496 (1973).
33. Friedmann, Selden Redivivus-Towards a Partition of the Seas?, 65
A-m. J. INT'L L. 757, 768 (1971).
34. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/49 (1971).
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together in a harmonious partnership, possibly sharing a single
directorate, so as to harmonize conflicting uses of ocean space and
preserve the integrity of the marine environment.
The agency should be a proper authority, with power to make
and carry out its own decisions, subject to the general policy guid-
ance of the United Nations. Specifically, it should have the power
to: 1) Develop and implement long-range plans for the best use
of the seabed, its subsurface and its living and non-living re-
sources; 2) Develop and enforce rules for the safe, efficient explo-
ration and exploitation of the international seabed area so as to
avoid conflicts of use; 3) Develop and enforce rules for the preser-
vation of the seabed environment as an integral part of the whole
marine environment; 4) Borrow and lend money on its own ac-
count; 5) Explore and exploit the area on its own account or in
partnership or joint ventures with States, regional organizations,
other United Nations agencies, consortia of States, or corporations;
6) License entities such as these to conduct operations on its be-
half, on a contract basis, or on their own with appropriate license
fees, royalties and perhaps other moneys to accrue to the Author-
ity; 7) Regulate prices of seabed minerals so as to avoid inordinate
disruption of the present market for these minerals deriving from
terrestrial sources; 8) Publish and otherwise disseminate results
of all exploration and exploitation carried out under its aegis as
rapidly as possible; 9) Provide and otherwise promote scientific
and technical training in marine affairs for personnel of develop-
ing countries; 10) Promote in other ways the transfer of marine
technology to developing countries; 11) Develop and operate ma-
chinery for the compulsory peaceful settlement of disputes which
may arise within its area of competence.
This is certainly a most ambitious scheme, and it is not antici-
pated that the Authority would immediately implement all of these
powers, but they should be granted to it and implemented over
a period of time as they become necessary and feasible.
The structure of the Authority must be such that it will be able
to carry out its functions expeditiously, economically and justly.
It should have a legislative body of some sort in which are rep-
resented all of the States which have ratified or adhered to the
'treaty establishing the Authority. In this assembly, each State
would have one vote. It would set policies, organize committees
for research and preparation of legislation and oversee the oper-
ations of the other organs of the Authority. There should be a
Council composed of representatives of the various groupings of
States: rich, poor and "socialist"; coastal, shelf-locked and land-
locked; Latin America, North America, Europe, Asia, Africa, the
Middle East and the Pacific Basin. It would be the executive
agency of the Authority, carrying out the policies of the Assembly,
promulgating detailed rules and regulations, contracting or signing
treaties with other parties, and supervising the exploration and
exploitation of the international seabed area.
There should be a Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General
nominated by the Council and approved by the Assembly. The
Secretariat would be responsible for housekeeping chores; provid-
ing information to the Council and the Assembly; training of per-
sonnel and the transfer of technology; dissemination of the results
of research and exploitation of the seabed; liaison with the high
seas authority and the United Nations; providing facilities for good
offices, conciliation and mediation for the compulsory settlement
of disputes; and performing other duties which might be assigned
to it by the Assembly and/or the Council. There would be no need
for a judicial organ, at least initially, since difficult problems could
be referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the Interna-
tional Court of Justice if the Authority's own peaceful settlement
machinery is inadequate. The Assembly would be empowered to
establish such technical commissions and specialized agencies as
may be deemed appropriate, responsible to it but receiving immedi-
ate supervision from the Council and logistical support from the
Secretariat. Qualified personnel to staff the Secretariat and the
specialized agencies would be selected with due regard for equi-
table representation of all contracting parties, including land-locked
States.
Clearly this is simply an outline of the major features of an
international seabed authority; details would have to be negotiated
in Caracas. It would, however, assure that land-locked States are
duly represented in all major and most minor organs of the Au-
thority and that their interests would be taken into account in
all of its decisions and activities.
THE DISTIUTION OF BENEurIs
Principle No. 7 of the United Nations Declaration of Principles
Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction reads:
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The exploration of the area and the exploitation of its resources
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irre-
spective of the geographical location of States, whether land-
locked or coastal, and taking into particular consideration the in-
terests and needs of the developing countries.3 5 (emphasis sup-
plied)
In dozens of resolutions, draft treaties, declarations of regional
groupings, and analyses and recommendations by individuals and
private groups since then, some variation of the phrase "equitable
sharing by States in 'the benefits" is given some degree of impor-
tance.3 6 It may be assumed, then, that there is general agreement
that even the countries without the wherewithal to develop seabed
resources, even those which have no direct access to the seacoast
whatever, should somehow derive some benefits from the develop-
ment of seabed resources. However, there is considerable disagree-
ment about details, ranging from proposals to give the "hard-core
least developed" States the largest share of net revenues of the
seabed authority to suggestions to let them have only token pay-
ments from uncertain revenue sources. All of these proposals can-
not be reviewed here; consideration can only be given to the likely
benefits to be obtained and to suggestions of some principles for
their distribution will be advanced.
The literature on the resources of the seabed and the continental
shelf, especially on petroleum and hard minerals, is abundant and
growing increasingly so. But publication still lags behind discov-
ery and much information is withheld from the public as military
or proprietary secrets. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the
continental margin contains enormous quantities of hydrocarbons
and some hard minerals, while the abyssal plain, oceanic ridges
and other submarine features beyond the margin contain enormous
quantities of hard minerals and perhaps some hydrocarbons. Re-
cent advances in submarine mining technology, summarized in two
United Nations publications,37 lead both to a sense of anticipation
of the great riches soon to be extracted from our ocean space and
distributed bountifully around the world, and to a sense of urgency
about the need to establish a suitable international mechanism for
35. G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV) (1970), 10 Int'l Legal Materials 220 (1971).
36. Id. at 222.
37. U.N. Doc. E/4973 (1971); U.N. Doe. A/AC.138/90 (1973).
regulating this new phase in the long story of man's exploitation of
his physical environment.
Two notes of caution must be sounded, however, before we pro-
ceed further in our discussion: 1) We must be careful not to ex-
aggerate the real wealth to accrue to the developing countries,
coastal or land-locked, from the seabed. Some of the broadest con-
tinental shelves are not particularly well endowed with resources,
and regardless of spectacular technological innovations, high risks
and costs of ocean mining are likely to keep profits low or nil
for many years and the poor countries will for a long time to
come have to rely on traditional sources for development funds;
and 2) Environmental concerns are likely to be largely ignored
in favor of short-term economic ones. Just as the rich countries
are generally unwilling to admit that it is in their interest to share
their wealth with the poor, so the poor countries are generally
unwilling to admit that it is in their interest to protect the environ-
ment. We have not yet reached the promised land.
A cogent article provides what is perhaps the most detailed re-
cent analysis of the question of the distribution of benefits.38 Us-
ing a systems approach, the author examines the likely returns
from ocean mining and various proposals for sharing these returns.
In the process, he considers the needs and problems of land-locked
and shelf-locked States. As he points out,
The economic interest of these countries does not depend pri-
marily on the specific boundary of national-international jurisdic-
tion. Of far greater importance are the provisions of the regime,
and in particular those for the areas of the continental margin
where oil and gas may be found. The objection of the land-
locked and shelf-locked countries to wide limits stems from the
fact that the wider the limit for national jurisdiction the lower
the revenue potential for the international machinery from oil and
gas production in the international area. A meaningful revenue
sharing scheme, however, would increase the scope of revenues
for the international machinery by providing for some contribu-
tions from mineral exploitation much closer to the shore of coastal
States than could otherwise be realistically expected. 9
The number and variety of proposed revenue-sharing schemes,
involving wealth extracted from the international area alone, the
international and national zones, or the international and some
kind of intermediate zones, are considerable. Whatever scheme is
finally adopted, however, should include as a minimum the follow-
ing conditions: 1) The land-locked States must be included spe-
38. Kanenas, Wide Limits and "Equitable" Distribution of Seabed Re-
sources, 1 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 137 (1973).
39. Id. at 154-55.
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cifically in the relevant conventions as having a right to a share
in the revenues from the development of the international area
not less than that assigned to coastal developing States, in partial
compensation for their having been left, by accidents of history
and geography, bereft of frontage on the sea; 2) The revenues de-
rived from all sources including auction sales receipts, license fees,
royalties, taxes and profits from sales of resources should, when
shared out, total an amount which could reasonably be considered
"equitable" as a proportion of total revenues from the international
area; 3) Revenues from the international area should be supple-
mented by a reasonable share of the revenues to 'be derived from
activities on the continental margin and seabed between the limit
of the territorial sea and the limit of the international area.
Finally, it should not be forgotten that the land-locked and shelf-
locked countries must have an opportunity, on the basis of equality
with coastal States, to participate actively themselves or through
licenses in the exploration and exploitation of the international
seabed area, notwithstanding that it may not be feasible for most
of them to do so for some time to come. This aspect of the situa-
tion is considered at some length, though tentatively, in an early
United Nations study of land-locked countries and the seabed. One
point made in the summary is that:
[I]n the event that land-locked countries were to engage individu-
ally in direct exploration and exploitation activities, although their
position as regards activities on the high seas or on the sea-bed
might be subject to the same conditions as those applicable to
other States, consideration would have to be given to the adequacy
of existing arrangements as regards transit rights through the
coastal State or State of transit, the need for coastal facilities and
transit through inland waters and the territorial sea.40
REALISm AND IDEA SM ON THE SEABED
What has been presented here so far is admittedly idealistic, a
plea for internationalism in a world in which the reality is nation-
alism. Thus, reluctant concession must be made to realism, even
while admitting the essential truth of Friedmann's dictum, "To-
day's 'realism' [nationalism] becomes the madness of tomorrow."41
The land-locked countries themselves appear to have succumbed
40. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/37 (1971) at 92.
41. Friedmann, supra note 33, at 81.
to "realism" and throughout the five-years' labor of the Seabed
Committee have not united and fought hard for their interests,
which are largely congruent with those of the coastal developing
countries. In the last session of the Seabed Committee, in the sum-
mer of 1973, seven of them offered twenty-two "draft articles re-
lating to land-locked States. 14 2 Only three mildly-worded articles
pertain to the seabed. They are as follows:
ARTICLE XVII
Access to and from the sea-bed area
(1) Land-locked States shall have the right of free access to and
from the area of the sea-bed in order to enable them to partici-
pate in the exploration and exploitation of the area and its re-
sources and to derive benefits therefrom in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention.
(2) For this purpose the land-locked States shall have the right
to use all means and facilities provided for in this Convention with
regard to traffic in transit.
ARTICLE XVIII
Representation of land-locked States
In any organ of the international sea-bed machinery in which
not all Member States will be represented, in particular in its
Council, there shall be an adequate and proportionate number of
land-locked States, both developing and developed.
ARTICLE XIX
Decision-making
(1) In any organ of the machinery, decisions on questions of sub-
stance shall be made with due regard to the special needs and
problems of land-locked States.
(2) On questions of substance which affect the interests of land-
locked States, decisions shall be made with their participation.
International law is being created today largely through the po-
litical process, with nearly 150 States participating. A far cry in-
deed from the beginnings of international law several centuries
ago. International law being created now is clearly a bundle of
compromises which may completely satisfy no one, but on the
other hand, the new international law does not completely alienate
so many States that it is rejected outright. And so whatever legis-
lation emerges from the Caracas conference or its probable second
session in Vienna in 1975 is likely to fall somewhere between the
mildly optimistic proposals presented here and the cold, grim view
expressed by the Soviet delegation at a Seabed Committee meet-
ing:
The interpretation of the concept of the common heritage of
mankind in the sense that this is wealth that belongs to every-
42. U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/93 (1973); U.N. Doc. A.9021 (1973).
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body, would from the political standpoint be unreal, . . . nor do
we believe there is any ground for including . . a provision
whereby the regime to govern the exploitation of the resources
of the seabed should insure the equitable sharing by States in the
benefits derived therefrom. .. 43
The United States Draft Convention, submitted to the Seabed
Committee in August 1970, proposed a number of compromises of
conflicting interests. One of the most imaginative and potentially
trend-setting proposals was for a Trusteeship Zone, a kind of buffer
zone between the 200 meter isobath, representing the outer limit
of national jurisdiction on the continental shelf, and the outer
edge of the continental margin. In this zone the coastal State
would act as agent of the international authority in many respects,
while still operating therein on its own account. Unfortunately,
this proposal appears to have been submerged in a tide of opposi-
tion on several grounds. Many former colonies opposed the whole
notion of trusteeship as a form of "neocolonialism." One legal
scholar opposed it because "If States are given jurisdiction over
that area for certain purposes, the phenomenon of 'creeping juris-
diction' will not fail to manifest itself. '44
Another view of some sort of "international zone" concept is that
it is "an unnecessary and burdensome price to pay to make the
international regime more acceptable to coastal nations" but in-
stead it "may be useful and even essential in achieving an accepta-
ble balance of competence between coastal nations and the interna-
tional regime."45  Only a year after introducing it, Ambassador
Stevenson signaled its demise when he told the Seabed Committee
on August 10, 1972,
... in order to achieve agreement, we are prepared to agree
to broad coastal State jurisdiction in adjacent waters and seabed
areas beyond the territorial sea as part of an overall law of the
sea settlement. However ... it is essential that coastal State ju-
risdiction over the mineral resources of the continental margin be
43. U.N. Doe. A/C.1/PV.1798, at 31. Perhaps the best discussion of the
Soviet position on maritime matters is W.E. BUTLER, THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE LAW OF T=E SEA (1971). See also R.J. EmacKsoN, INTERNATrONAL
LAW AND =i REVOLUTIONARY STATE (1972).
44. Ibler, The Interests of Shelf-locked States and the Proposed Devel-
opment of the Law of the Sea, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 403 (1971).
45. Legg, Seabed Regimes and the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 19
SEA GRANT TECHNCAL BuLL. (1972).
subject to international standards and compulsory settlement of
disputes. 4 6
Here is a clear case of idealism bowing to realism.
Other far-sighted proposals are likely to be similarly watered
down. It is unlikely, for example, that the international seabed
authority will have even the statutory authorization to conduct
mining operations itself due to opposition from American mining
interests and many developing countries. Mining codes are likely
to be left to the several coastal States, with only the broadest
guidelines laid down by treaty or by the international authority.
There is likely to be no effective moratorium on deep sea mining
pending the coming into force of an international convention and
the establishment of an international authority. While a narrow
national zone on the shelf and a strong seabed authority would
be in the long-term best interests of the developing countries and
the land-locked countries, neither is likely to be achieved. We
must therefore look for another compromise formula to substitute
for the intermediate zone concept.
Mention has been made from time to time in the Seabed Commit-
tee and in the literature of regional cooperation in the develop-
ment of the continental shelf and the seabed out to the limit of
the international zone.47 In combination with at least a moder-
ately strong international authority, regional organizations com-
posed of coastal, shelf-locked, land-locked, insular and sea-locked
States, cutting across ideological lines where possible, may be the
best attainable instrument for achieving a harmonization of the
four basic objectives of any seabed regime.
These objectives are: 1) achievement of the greatest good for
the greatest number of people on earth; 2) equity in sharing the
46. This general statement was elaborated upon in Draft Articles for
a Chapter on the Rights and Duties of States in the Coastal Seabed Eco-
nomic Area. Submitted to Sea-bed Committee in 1973 (A/AC.138/SC.II
L. 35 and Corr.1). Article 1 begins, "the coastal State shall have the exclu-
sive right to explore and exploit and authorize the exploration and exploi-
tation of the natural resources of the seabed subsoil and in accordance
with its own laws and regulations in the coastal sea-bed economic area."
Though the rest of the articles detail some limitations on these "exclusive
rights" and some obligations of the coastal states, including the sharing
of revenues from mineral exploitation of the economic zone, the proposal
still represents a considerable retreat by the United States.
47. Two landlocked States, Uganda and Zambia, made a formal, though
quite general, proposal for regionalism in their Draft Articles on the
Proposed Economic Zone submitted to the Sea-Bed Committee in 1973
(A/AC.138/SC. II/L.41). They suggested "regional economic zones," with
outer limits unspecified, in which regional or subregional authorities would
explore, exploit and manage exclusively al of the resources of the zone
on behalf of all of the States in the region or subregion.
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wealth of the sea so that even minorities, such as the land-locked
States, will attain a fair share of the benefits; 3) preservation
of the integrity of the marine environment, all of ocean space;
and 4) experience in cooperation and international administration
so that "national sovereignty" will not be so difficult to dilute or
give up altogether at some time in the future.
The regional sea development organizations would share both
the risks and the benefits of developing, as integrated units, the
groups of zones within the limits of national jurisdiction. Thus,
even if these limits are far out to sea, the regional units will re-
duce the disadvantages of cutting up the "indivisible ecological
whole" of the sea into numerous pieces.
Many questions remain unanswered. For example: What is a
region? How would membership in a region be determined? How
would the costs, risks and benefits be apportioned? What kind
of formal organization would be appropriate? How would the re-
gions cooperate with one another, with the international authority
and with the United Nations? For the present, we can only say
that the regions themselves will have to work out these and other
problems on the basis of good will, experience in other spheres,
and trial-and-error.
In this way, the land-locked States would be able to participate
in one of man's greatest adventures-the development of the sea-
on a footing of equality with all other States, with no apologies
and no pleading for concessions. Why is it worthwhile assuring
that even the small, poor, weak and isolated land-locked countries
of the world are helped in this way by their more fortunate breth-
ren? Robert S. McNamara may have expressed the reason best
when he discussed development assistance in his address to the
Board of Governors of the World Bank Group in Nairobi on Sep-
tember 24, 1973:
There are, of course, many grounds for development assistance;
among others, the expansion of trade, the strengthening of interna-
tional stability, and the reduction of social tensions.
But in my view the fundamental case for development assist-
ance is the moral one. The whole of human history has recognized
the principle-at least in the abstract-that the rich and the pow-
erful have a moral obligation to assist the poor and the weak. That
is what the sense of community is all about-any community: the
community of the family, the community of the village, the com-
munity of the nation, the community of nations itself.
